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THE MARKET AS INSTRUMENT: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR HARRISON
Shubha Ghosh*
I. INTRODUCTION
ROFESSOR Harrison's article1 is a provocative response to an
often unarticulated question: Why does current antitrust law treat
market power as presumptively legal? This question, as posed, is
especially vexing given the influence of economic thinking on antitrust
doctrine. As Professor Harrison points out, textbook economics 2 teaches
that market power in most instances leads to inefficiency. 3 Why then
does an antitrust law influenced by economic theory not do more to deter
and punish market power?
Professor Harrison does not answer this last question. Instead, his re-
view of recent case law shows, correctly, that federal courts are confused
about how to deal with market power. 4 Contemporary antitrust law regu-
lates and punishes the anticompetitive conduct that arises from the pos-
session of market power, rather than the mere possession itself.
Professor Harrison concludes from this situation that contemporary anti-
trust law, while nominally touched by economics, is political in its applica-
tion.5 While he does not fully explain the nature of politics in antitrust
law, he does offer a solution to this perceived folly. Under his proposed
instrumental approach to market power, courts should apply antitrust
scrutiny closely when consumers clearly do not benefit from sellers pos-
sessing of market power.6 Courts, however, should leave firms with mar-
ket power alone when consumers benefit from the presence of market
power, such as when the market power is useful for innovation, for realiz-
ing the benefits of increasing scale, or for network effects in consump-
tion.7 Market power that is the result of luck or circumstances, what
Professor Harrison calls circumstantial market power,8 and market power
that is justified by buyer decision making or consensual market power are
* Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law
1. Jeffrey L. Harrison, An Instrumental Theory of Market Power and Antitrust Policy,
59 SMU L. REV. 1673 (2006).
2. See, e.g., LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS
596 (2002).
3. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1678.
4. See id. at 1708.
5. Id. at 1676.
6. Id. at 1677.
7. Id. at 1681.
8. Id. at 1683.
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particularly deserving of condemnation under antitrust law. 9 In short,
Professor Harrison's article does not answer why antitrust law is the way
it is but instead suggests how to cure the current ills of what he sees as a
politicized antitrust law.
But the ignored "why" question is certainly the interesting question to
explore, the $64,000 question (or however much questions go for nowa-
days). To conclude that antitrust law, by not adequately confronting mar-
ket power, is informed more by politics than economics ignores tensions
within economic thinking about the proper treatment of market power.
This tension pervades economic theory and antitrust doctrine and policy.
An excellent account of the tension in economic theory is provided by
David Warsh, a journalist who writes insightfully about business and eco-
nomics. Warsh has recently demonstrated that there is a tension in eco-
nomic theory, originating with Adam Smith, between the benefits of
competition and the benefits of large firms.10 I propose that the contra-
diction identified by Professor Harrison is a symptom of this broader con-
fusion. Markets work with many small firms competing with each other
to provide the best service at the lowest price, but sometimes large firms
can produce better goods more cheaply than small ones. So which should
the legal system favor: the protection of small firms and competition or
the promotion of large firms that can realize economies of scale? As Pro-
fessor Harrison's article convincingly and unintentionally shows, the di-
lemma at the heart of economics unsurprisingly also pervades
contemporary antitrust law.
Perhaps it is inevitable that an antitrust law riddled with the contradic-
tion inherent in economic theory leads to what Professor Harrison de-
scribes as politicized decision making.1 1 This conclusion, however,
assumes that the absence of scientific certainty is filled by politics. But
that conclusion implicitly assumes that economic inquiry leads to scien-
tific certainty and that political choices are absent from economic and
legal analysis. Professor Harrison does not clarify what type of politics
informs contemporary antitrust law's treatment of market power. For
some, the Chicago School approach to antitrust represents a series of po-
litical choices marked by rightward shifts during the Eighties in the tem-
peraments of the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission,
and federal courts.' 2 From this perspective, the response to Professor
Harrison's conclusion is mirabile dictu. But there is something deeper
going on than just a regime change in antitrust enforcement. What Pro-
fessor Harrison is noticing are the deep problems in a purely efficiency-
minded approach to antitrust law (and law more broadly). Invariably,
judgments based on efficiency, however defined, rest on judgments about
9. Id. at 1698.
10. DAVID WARSH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: A STORY OF Eco-
NOMIC DISCOVERY 37-47 (2006).
11. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1712.
12. See, e.g., MARC ALLEN EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS:
INSTITUTIONS, EXPERTISE, AND POLICY CHANGE 103-07 (1991).
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distribution: who should get the surplus created by markets? It is not
inconsistent for courts to espouse efficiency in antitrust law and to con-
clude that possession of market power is not actionable. 13 This paradox
can be understood as an attempt to maximize welfare (efficiency) given a
particularly desired distribution of well-being. 14 The explanation for why
this particular distribution is desirable is a political one. If that is what
Professor Harrison means by a politicized antitrust law (and I am con-
vinced that is what he must mean), then the current confusion in an eco-
nomically informed antitrust law also reflects the impossibility of
implementing the criteria of efficiency without considering questions of
distribution.
So, does the combination of Professor Harrison's thesis and my exposi-
tion mean that an antitrust law informed by economics is invariably hope-
less and ultimately misguided? Should we simply recognize that antitrust
is a political, historical, sociological, or some other non-economic phe-
nomenon and work from there? The error is not in developing an eco-
nomic perspective on antitrust law. Rather, the problem is in reducing
antitrust to an idealized model of competition and markets. Ultimately, a
correct antitrust decision is one that looks at all dimensions of a business
relationship in order to determine the appropriate application of antitrust
doctrine. "All dimensions" includes economics. The pertinent question
is not whether economics should inform antitrust law, but how. The more
difficult question is how to coordinate an economic analysis of antitrust
with other perspectives in developing doctrine.
Like Fermat, let me say that I have a remarkable solution to the prob-
lem of how to reconcile and unify all fields of human thought, but space
limits my ability to tell you the answer. Instead, this paper will address
the more narrow question of what kind of economic approach is appro-
priate to antitrust law. Professor Harrision's article offers a glimpse of
the answer in its presentation of a Coasean approach to market power.15
I do not completely agree with his analysis, but I do believe that the ap-
proach he outlines is a very fruitful path in antitrust theory. Professor
Alan Meese is perhaps the most accomplished representative of this ap-
proach, which goes alternatively by the labels of transaction cost econom-
ics, Coasean theory, or the new institutional economics. 16 This approach
provides a means to bridge economic theories of markets with other disci-
plinary approaches such as history and sociology. The alternative ap-
proach also reconciles the inherent tensions in the traditional economic
13. Id. at 239-40.
14. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 12-15 (1982); Herbert Hovenkamp, Fact, Value, and Theory in Antitrust
Adjudication, 1987 DUKE L.J. 897, 911-12 (1987).
15. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1680-81.
16. See generally, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting:
How the Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
21 (2005); Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 743 (2005).
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theory of competition and scale that leads to the contradictions that Pro-
fessor Harrison documents.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts. Part Two devel-
ops the argument that the tension noted by Professor Harrison is inherent
in conventional economic theory of competition and the firm. This part
traces the tension back to the Structure-Conduct-Performance approach
to antitrust-the dominant economic approach that pre-dated the Chi-
cago School. Part Three explains how the Coasean approach, suggested
by Professor Harrison, offers a potentially richer approach to antitrust
and resolves the contradiction between competition and large firm size.
Part Four further explores alternative economic approaches to antitrust
by focusing on the antitrust-intellectual property interface, one of the ex-
amples cited by Professor Harrison in his instrumental approach to mar-
ket power.17 Part Five concludes with some parting thoughts on
instrumentalism in antitrust law.
II. COMPETITION AND FIRM SIZE: HOW THE CHICAGO
SCHOOL TRIED TO FINESSE THE STRUCTURE-
CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE APPROACH
AND FAILED
The Chicago School that rose to the ascendancy in the 1980s is associ-
ated with an economic theory of antitrust. However, the Structure-Con-
duct-Performance ("SCP") school, the dominant approach to antitrust in
the Sixties and Seventies, was also informed heavily by economics.18 The
key difference is that the SCP approach was not single-mindedly focused
on efficiency as a criteria.1 9 Instead, the approach relied on empirical
methods guided by a very specific understanding of the structure of mar-
kets and competition.20 The Chicago School grew to ascendancy because
of the inability of SCP to fully reconcile the tension in economic theory
between competition and firm size. 21 However, the finesse of the Chi-
cago School also failed to resolve the tension, leading to the current con-
tradictory treatment of market power noted by Professor Harrison. 22
The starting point for the SCP approach was the recognition that per-
fect competition, with its characteristics of full and complete information,
costless entry and exit of firms and consumers, and rational maximizing
behavior based on well-defined technologies and preferences, would lead
to the most efficient distribution of goods in an economy.2 3 However,
SCP also recognized that real world markets can deviate from perfect
17. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1674-75.
18. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and
Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 43, 52 (2000).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 53-54.
22. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1675.
23. John Kay, Economics and Business, 101 ECON. J. 57, 58 (1991).
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competition as one or more of the economic assumptions failed to hold.2 4
Based on the deviations from the perfectly competitive model, markets
can be described by certain well defined structures such as monopoly,
monopolistic competition, or oligopoly. 25 Structure would imply certain
types of conduct by firms in the market, and this conduct had implications
for performance. 26 Under the SPC approach, the key to resolution of a
particular antitrust case required the identification of the relevant market
structure of the industry at issue, a comparison of the observed conduct
of firms in the industry with the performance predicted by the identified
structure, and an assessment of market performance as predicted by the
deviation of observed conduct from predicted conduct.27
There were two big problems with the SCP approach. The first was its
focus on the ideal type of the perfectly competitive market. The SCP
approach would espouse using antitrust to shape markets as close as pos-
sible to the perfectly competitive model. 28 However, the ability to realize
perfect competition depends upon the efficient size of firms. 29 The ideal
of perfect competition required firms to be relatively small.30 However,
there could be benefits from firms being relatively big. Having larger
firms would necessarily imply a different market structure, market con-
duct, and market performance than what would be desirable under the
model of perfect competition. This recognition of alternative market
structures leads to the second problem: the proper treatment of oligop-
oly. The vast majority of markets could be described as oligopolistic mar-
kets that were in between the ideal of perfect competition with a large
number of firms and monopoly with only one. The problem was that
economic theory was not completely clear about the conduct and per-
formance of oligopolies. In some cases, an oligopoly could realize the
benefits of perfect competition. In others, an oligopoly could be as perni-
cious as a monopoly. Since economic theory could not offer guidance on
conduct and performance, the SCP approach was unhelpful when anti-
trust law had to be applied to oligopolistic markets, which described most
of the markets that were the subject of antitrust scrutiny. 31
24. See generally EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOP-
OLY PROBLEM (1957); L.W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and An-
titrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1104 (1979).
25. See generally Weiss, supra note 24.
26. Id.
27. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION 2-4 (2000); EISNER, supra note 12, at 100-03 (describing the SCP approach).
28. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 51-52 (documenting the aggressive ap-
proach to market dominance under the SCP approach that increasingly came in conflict
with developments in economic theory holding that "departures from perfect competition
are normal").
29. See, e.g., Francis Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 353-54
(1955) (describing conditions for perfectly competitive markets).
30. See id. at 354 (noting that firm size is important in assuring perfect competition).
31. For a discussion and response to the problem of eligopoly in the SCP approach,
see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 55-56, 93-95 (2001). For a general discussion,
see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 104-07 (1987).
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The problems with SCP illustrate the tension in economic theory be-
tween the ideal of perfect competition and firm size. The benefits of rela-
tively large firms implied oligopolistic market structure, which
contradicted the ideal of perfect competition. The Chicago School was in
part a response to the failures of the SCP approach. 32 Unlike the SCP's
approach on structure, the Chicago School focused on behavior and as-
sessed antitrust law in light of a simple question: how would rational firms
and consumers behave in the marketplace in order to maximize individ-
ual and social welfare? 33 Antitrust should intervene only when rational
firms and consumers would act in a way harmful to social welfare as
gauged by the competitive process. For instance, the Chicago School
would strongly endorse using antitrust law to rout out price fixing among
firms in an industry.34 While it may be individually and jointly rational to
engage in price fixing, the marketplace and consumers would be hurt by
such rational behavior. Furthermore, certain behavior such as tying and
vertical restraints might be both individually rational and welfare enhanc-
ing and therefore immunized from antitrust scrutiny. By adopting the
assumptions of rational behavior, the Chicago School moved away from
the rigid structuralist approach of SCP towards a more flexible, context
specific approach. This shift was reflected doctrinally by a move from per
se rules to the rule of reason as the standard for antitrust review of busi-
ness behavior. 35
A behavioral, as opposed to a structural, perspective on antitrust not
only allowed for more flexibility but also allowed for a more realistic un-
derstanding of business conduct. Unfortunately, the Chicago School did
not resolve the inherent tension between competition and scale in eco-
nomic theory. For if the approach was correct in assuming rational be-
havior, then the case could be made that all economic activity could be
undertaken by one large firm that produced and distributed all goods and
services to consumers. Such a large firm would internalize all the con-
tractual and other externalities that would arise in the marketplace and
result, in some situations, in a welfare maximizing outcome. The obvious
objection to this arrangement is that a large firm would act like a monop-
oly in restraining output and raising prices. This objection could be ad-
dressed by allowing either for perfect price discrimination by the firm or
by strict application of antitrust law to monopolistic behavior. Nonethe-
32. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 52-53 (documenting the emergence of the
Chicago School as a response to the structural approach of antitrust law in the 1970s).
33. See id. at 55-56 (discussing the importance of the assumption of rational behavior
in the Chicago School approach and a need for more realistic approaches in the post-
Chicago School). See also Franklin M. Fisher, Organizing Industrial Organization: Reflec-
tions on the Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
AcTIviTy MICROECONoMics 201, 218 (1991) (contrasting the SCP approach with the Chi-
cago approach, described as "the program of investigating how perfectly rational oppo-
nents will behave in overly simplified environments").
34. See, e.g., EISNER, supra note 12, at 180-81.
35. See, e.g., id. at 53-56. For a good example of this shift, see State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (overturning precedent applying per se treatment of maximum resale
price maintenance).
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less, the Chicago School did not resolve the basic questions that I have
raised in this paper: when is it desirable to have vigorous competition
among many firms, and when is it desirable to have a few large firms that
can realize the benefits of scale?
Professor Harrison's article fits exactly within the contours of the prob-
lem of competition and firm size. If bigness is not per se problematic,
then antitrust law will invariably tolerate some market power. The point
that this tolerance contradicts economic theory, first of all, confuses mo-
nopoly power and market power and, second of all, ignores the debates
over competition and firm size in economic theory. As to the first point,
the confusion between monopoly power and market power is reflected at
the very beginning of Professor Harrison's paper, where he alternates be-
tween the two terms.36 Market power is the ability of a firm or a group of
firms to affect some dimension of the market, whether it is price, quantity
traded, or some other aspect of the contract between buyers and sellers.
Monopoly power is a type of market power which arises when there is a
single firm selling in the market. Economic textbooks point out that mo-
nopoly power, when exercised in a particular way, can lead to inefficiency
in the form of reduced quantity, increased price, and lost consumer sur-
plus. 3 7 Harrison, however, also points out that market power, including
monopoly power, can be the basis for innovation and the realization of
the benefits of scale. 38 These benefits, however, depend upon how the
market power is exercised.
This last point is key to my argument. The existence of market power
does not imply anything about how that power is exercised. To generalize
my claim, prescriptions about antitrust enforcement depend on concep-
tions of competition. If one believes that competition can occur only
among several small firms, then the existence of any market power would
mandate antitrust scrutiny. I think Professor Harrison has this pre-ex-
isting notion of competition. But competition can also exist among large
firms.39 It can exist if there are only two firms in the marketplace. 40 It
can also exist if there is only one firm as long as there is the possibility of
entry.41 The questions are how does competition occur and what are the
rules of engagement. If one accepts these statements, then antitrust law
will invariably tolerate some market power, and the quandary raised by
Professor Harrison transforms into a new set of questions. Rather than
asking why we tolerate market power, we should be asking what type of
competition is desirable, and how can antitrust law help us to reach that.
Answering this question will require that we also grapple with the central
problem in economics that has appeared throughout this discussion: how
36. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1673 n.3.
37. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 27, at 94-96.
38. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1679.
39. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 27, at 76.
40. Id. at 167-168 (discussing Bertrand model of price war).
41. Id. at 76 (discussing contestable markets).
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do we reconcile the benefits of competition with the benefits of large firm
size?
The instrumental approach to market power proposed by Professor
Harrison provides a basis for reconciling competition with the benefits of
large firm size. Under the instrumental approach, market power would
be presumptively legal if its presence is related to innovation, productive
efficiency, or network effects.42 More generally, Professor Harrison's so-
lution would allow market power if its benefits to consumers combined
with the saved costs of enforcement are greater than the deadweight loss
and distributional cost from the presence of market power.43 The instru-
mental approach assumes competition to be the default position in the
marketplace and allows deviation only when the benefits of market
power outweigh the costs, where the benefits can include the benefits of
scale.44 Professor Harrison's approach is tolerant of some market power
but only market power that leads to benefits for consumers.45 The instru-
mental approach is arguably less tolerant of market power than current
antitrust doctrine. The problem is that the instrumental approach offers
only a partial answer to the scope of antitrust scrutiny. While the instru-
mental approach would bring more cases under antitrust scrutiny, it is not
clear whether the resolution of the cases would be different from current
case law. For example, Professor Harrison is critical of Jefferson Parish
Hospital v. Hyde,46 where the Supreme Court effectively upheld a tying
arrangement, for being tolerant of consensual market power or market
power that arises from voluntary consumer choice.47 But he also states
that there were alternative paths to the same result that rested on consid-
eration of the hospital's market share.48 The instrumental approach will
not necessarily change the outcomes of many antitrust cases, but it may
change the way in which courts perceive market power.
What is perhaps the most frustrating about the instrumental approach
is that it offers more of a change in form rather than substance. Shifting
the presumption of legality of market power to a rebuttable presumption
is an important step, but as currently articulated, the instrumental ap-
proach would allow the antitrust defendant to show some benefit to con-
sumers in order to escape antitrust scrutiny. What is helpful about the
proposed approach is that it asks us to think about how antitrust should
deal with the presence of market power. Related to this question is one
of what type of competition antitrust should foster. Professor Harrison
provides an important first step in rethinking these questions, and I de-
velop these points in the next section.
42. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1680.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 1680.
45. Id. at 1680-81.
46. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
47. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1694-96.
48. Id.
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III. COASE TO THE RESCUE?: MARKET POWER AS A
BUNDLE OF LEGAL RIGHTS
Professor Harrison contends that the current treatment of market
power under antitrust law is inconsistent with economic theory.49 I have
suggested that the inconsistency he identifies is inherent in the tension in
economic theory between the benefits of competition and the benefits of
large firm size. It is interesting to note that a canonical case for the in-
strumental theory of market power is the famous opinion by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa"). 5°
Law and economics scholars are famous for co-opting Judge Hand as one
of their own, and so it is not surprising that Professor Harrison turns to
Hand for assistance. Although Professor Harrison is critical of the Alcoa
opinion for its emphasis on conduct rather than possession of market
power, he praises the decision for critically assessing when possession of
market power is not justified. 51 What is most interesting about the Alcoa
decision, as well as Judge Hand's decisions more broadly, is the nuanced
way in which the judge combined an understanding of economics con-
cepts with an assessment of the facts of a case. The judge did not simply
grind through the theory or force the facts into the template of an eco-
nomic model. Instead, he weighed economic theory and business and so-
cial facts together to reach a decision. Perhaps what is needed to
reconcile the tension between competition and firm size in economics as
reflected in antitrust doctrine on market power is to adopt a more prag-
matic and ecumenical approach to theory and facts in antitrust jurispru-
dence. Some guidance on this approach is offered by understanding
market power in the language of legal rights and transaction costs follow-
ing from the work of Ronald Coase.52
Professor Harrison suggests such an approach when he frames the pre-
sumption of the legality of market power in terms of who should have the
right to operate as a monopolist.53 Professor Harrison sees the problem
as one of whether the monopolist should have the right to operate as a
monopolist or whether consumers should have the right to be free of a
monopoly.5 4 In a transaction cost-less world,55 consumers should always
be given the right to be free from a monopoly, since the benefits to con-
sumers from competitive pricing would outweigh the benefits to the mo-
nopolist of restricting output and raising price. The only exception to this
allocation of the right would be the situation where the rents created by
the monopolist would create consumer benefits such as innovation, pro-
49. Id. at 1673.
50. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
51. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1687.
52. See generally RONALD COASE, Tim FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1990).
53. Harrison, supra note 1, at 1681.
54. Id.
55. For a discussion of the meaning of this assumption and its limits, see David A.
Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction
Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 61 (2005).
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ductive efficiencies, or network effects. In this situation, consumers
would benefit from the monopolist having the right and therefore would
not purchase the monopolist's right back through a costless transaction.
Therefore, courts should allow market power only when the possession of
such power creates benefits for consumers, but otherwise, courts should
protect the consumers' right to be free of market power.
This framing is useful in identifying market power as a bundle of legal
rights. If a firm has market power, it has the right to undertake certain
acts. Therefore, Professor Harrison is correct in recognizing that market
power is essentially a set of rights that the state grants to the holder of
market power. However, Professor Harrison's analysis does not go far
enough in identifying what this bundle entails and how it can be allo-
cated. The analysis, first of all, suffers from an imprecision in the defini-
tion of the right at issue. The "right to operate as a monopolist" includes
many rights. If the right captures pricing or output decisions, it is not
clear what difference it makes if the consumer has the right to determine
price or output or if the firm or firms have this right. For example, if
there is one firm and many consumers, it is not clear why the firm would
not simply reject any low price offers made by consumers until all the
consumer surplus has been extracted by the firm. In fact, Professor Har-
rison's scenario in which consumers would buy the right from the monop-
olist would essentially entail the consumers transferring the entire
consumers' surplus to the single firm in order to obtain the right. Fur-
thermore, the "right to operate as a monopolist" might entail "the right
to exclude new firms from entering the market." This formulation of the
right is the relevant one for an analysis of intellectual property, as I ex-
plain in Section Four, but requires inclusion of new entrants as players
that bargain with the existing firm and possibly existing consumers in or-
der to determine who values this right the most.
While Professor Harrison is correct in identifying the possession of
market power with legal rights, his Coasean analysis superimposes an im-
plicit model of bargaining over the set of legal rights onto an implicit
model of competition over the allocation of goods and services. Neither
of these models are made particularly clear, and each is important to un-
derstand in order to make sense of how antitrust law should deal with
market power. If the underlying model of competition is one of many
small firms, then the right to be free of a monopolist should arguably be
allocated among consumers and possibly new firms to ensure that the
model of competition prevails. If the underlying model of competition is
one of few firms engaged in a Bertrand price war, then the right to be
free of a monopolist should be allocated among possible firms in the mar-
ketplace in order to ensure that the price is driven down to marginal cost.
The competitive model for the allocation of goods and services will deter-
mine how price and quantity are determined. The bargaining model over
the distribution of legal rights will determine how surplus will be distrib-
uted among the various players in the marketplace. One cannot deter-
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mine the regime of legal rights, and hence the distribution of market
power, without some determination of how the competitive process
functions.
The Coasean approach seems to be a hopeless mess, and certainly,
much work needs to be done in sorting through the relationship between
the bargaining model over rights and the competitive model for the allo-
cation of goods and services. But as a practical matter of how to design
the law in order to reflect the theory, Judge Hand may once again offer
some assistance. In Alcoa, Judge Hand adopted a methodology that
looked at business and social facts with the assistance of economic heuris-
tics to sort through the data. An instrumental approach to market power
might follow the lead of Judge Hand. Such an instrumental approach
would focus on the benefits of large firm size and also take into consider-
ation the social and business realities of how competition occurs in a par-
ticular industry. With this set of information, the court can address the
question of how the set of legal rights that give rise to market power
(whether it is the right to exclude, the right to set prices, or the right to
determine output) should be allocated among the relevant players in the
industry. Antitrust treatment of market power would reflect this assign-
ment of rights.
The instrumental approach I am suggesting is different from Professor
Harrison's formulaic approach, but it recognizes his insight that presum-
ing the legality of market power is inconsistent with economic theory.
Furthermore, the approach incorporates both the benefits of competition
and the benefits of firm size by adopting a contextual, rather than struc-
tural, notion of competition. Finally, the approach adopts an implicitly
behavioral approach by formulating conduct into rights and asking
whether a player should have the legal right to engage in certain types of
business conduct, or whether it is an agreement to set prices or the ability
to exclude a competitor or a consumer.
Critics will undoubtedly be concerned with the seeming lack of cer-
tainty in my approach. The problem my approach cures is the tendency
in antitrust law to derive bright line rules from economic models of com-
petition as opposed to the business realities of competition and poten-
tially anti-competitive behavior. For example, consensual market power
would receive more scrutiny under my approach than under current law,
because the threshold question would not be whether consumers con-
sented to purchase from the seller with market power, but whether the
consumer had the right to be free of certain terms in the resulting transac-
tion. In antitrust cases involving exclusionary conduct, such as Aspen Ski-
ing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,56 Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image,57 and CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.,58 the question would be
whether the defendant had the right to exclude or whether the exclusion-
56. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
57. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
58. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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ary behavior had anticompetitive effects in the particular industry. The
approach I am proposing shares in spirit with Professor Harrison's ap-
proach, but it attempts to address directly the tension in economic theory
between competition and firm size that has lead to the problematic treat-
ment of market power in current antitrust law. As one example of the
effectiveness of my proposal, I discuss its implications for the treatment
of intellectual property under antitrust law in the next section.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ANTITRUST, AND THE
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
The proper treatment of intellectual property under antitrust law pro-
vides a useful illustration of Professor Harrison's thesis and my critique.
Professor Harrison argues that the analysis of market power in intellec-
tual property law offers a model for assessing market power in antitrust
law. 59 Four features of the treatment of market power in intellectual
property law are particularly salient. 60 Intellectual property law recog-
nizes the benefits and costs of exclusivity. 61 Exclusivity within intellec-
tual property law is limited, because in some instances the costs will
outweigh the benefits, such as when intellectual property is used to fore-
close cumulative invention.62 More controversially, Professor Harrison
asserts that intellectual property recognizes market power as a type of
property that can be traded. 63 Finally, a key question for intellectual
property law is how exclusivity is to be determined by the allocation of
rights among intellectual property owners and users.64 Except for the
point about market power as a type of property, Professor Harrison of-
fers a useful and succinct formulation of intellectual property. However,
it is far from clear how this formulation helps in clarifying the analysis of
market power in antitrust law. I illustrate the limitation and then suggest
a solution.
During the 2005-2006 term, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether ownership of a patent created the presumption of market power
under antitrust. In Illinois Tool, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., the Court
considered a tying claim involving a patented laser printer cartridge and
unpatented ink.65 The plaintiff, Independent Ink, challenged the require-
ment of Illinois Tool that companies buying its patented cartridge also
buy its ink on the grounds that this entailed a leveraging of Illinois Tool's
market power in the cartridge market into the market for ink. 66 The dis-
trict court dismissed the claim, finding that Independent Ink had failed to






65. Ii. Tool, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
66. Id. at 1285.
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establish market power. 67 The Federal Circuit, hearing the case on ap-
peal, reversed the district court,68 citing Morton Salt v. United States,69
International Salt Co. v. United States,70 United States v. Loew's, Inc.,71
and Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde72-Supreme Court
precedents that had been interpreted as creating a presumption of market
power from ownership of a patent. 73 The Federal Circuit reasoned that,
since Illinois Tool has a patent on the cartridges, the ownership of a pat-
ent created a presumption of market power and therefore Independent
Ink had made a prima facie case for tying.74 The Supreme Court vacated
and remanded, clarifying a fifty-year precedent by holding that ownership
of a patent did not create a presumption of market power and that Inde-
pendent Ink had to establish market power to make its prima facie case. 75
The Court remanded to allow Independent Ink to introduce evidence of
Illinois Tool's market power in the market for cartridges. 76
Although Professor Harrison does not discuss the case, my educated
guess is that he would endorse the Supreme Court's reasoning. Since a
patent is a grant of exclusivity that is given to promote innovation, under
the instrumental approach, the benefits of market power would outweigh
the costs, and therefore there should be lower scrutiny and a presumption
of legality. Perhaps, Professor Harrison might think that the Court did
not go far enough under the terms of the instrumental approach, since the
Court simply removed the presumption of market power, and hence ille-
gality, rather than reverse the presumption altogether. But such a broad
approach would effectively immunize intellectual property from antitrust
scrutiny. It is not clear that Professor Harrison would go so far, but that
is the potential danger of the instrumental approach.
The fundamental problem is the assumption that the grant of the pat-
ent actually promotes innovation. Certainly, the theoretical and policy
justifications for a patent system are to promote innovation.77 But it is a
leap in logic to assume that obtaining a patent means that innovation has
occurred. Colleges are meant to promote education and knowledge, but
that does not mean the possessor of a lawfully obtained college degree is
educated or has knowledge. Of course, it does not mean the opposite
either. The presumption of market power from ownership of a patent
assumed that the exclusivity given by a patent would necessarily translate
into the ability to affect the market for the product. As the scholarly
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
70. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
71. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
72. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
73. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
74. Ill. Tool, 126 S. Ct. at 1293.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND
WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 23-24 (2004).
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literature cited by the Supreme Court shows, there is no reason to assume
that the ability to keep someone from making, using, selling, or offering
to sell your patented invention would foreclose competition from firms
that design around the invention or create substitutes.78 The problem is
that the instrumental approach, by equating intellectual property with in-
novation, can immunize patents from antitrust scrutiny when the patent
itself is questionable. Current patent reform debates focus precisely on
the issue of whether the current patent system does in fact foster innova-
tion or result in improperly granted rights of exclusivity. 79 Before that
debate is resolved, it would be a folly to presume that ownership of a
patent promotes innovation and an even greater folly to conclude that
ownership of a patent constitutes efficient or legal market power.
It is not completely clear that Professor Harrison would go as far as I
am taking the instrumental approach. There are limits within the instru-
mental approach that would de-ice the slippery slopes. For example, my
concerns about improperly granted patents could be incorporated in how
courts measure the benefit side of the formula. Antitrust plaintiffs could
be allowed to introduce evidence of patent invalidity to rebut any pre-
sumptions of legality that may arise from the instrumental approach.
But this modification underscores the point that the market power in-
quiry is a fact-intensive one. The assignment of legal presumptions
should, in part, reflect the burdens of presenting the underlying facts.80
This feature seems to have been wholly overlooked in the debate over the
presumption of market power from patents. One argument in favor of
the presumption of market power that was not considered in Illinois Tool
is that it places the burden on the patent owner to prove that he does not
have market power. Since patents involve fairly complicated technolo-
gies and arise from administrative processes that are primarily ex parte,
the patent owner may be in the better position to introduce evidence on
the nature of the technology, the effected markets, and the validity of the
patents. As a general matter, outside the patent context, there is no rea-
son to think why the antitrust defendant would be in a better position
than the antitrust plaintiff to introduce evidence of market power. There-
fore, from the perspective of evidentiary burdens, Professor Harrison is
correct to question the presumption of legality. However, it is still not
clear that the instrumental approach fares any better as the example of
Illinois Tool shows.
While the question of market power is a fact-intensive inquiry, it is also
informed by the allocation of legal rights that make market power action-
able. In the case of intellectual property, the legal right, very broadly, is
the right to exclude others from using the subject of intellectual property.
78. See Ill. Tool, 126 S. Ct. at 1291 n.4.
79. See A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 39-41 (STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET
AL. EDS., 2004).
80. See Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric Talley, & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Legal Presump-
tions, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2000).
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More specifically, this right to exclude translates into the exclusive right
to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import for patent law into the exclusive
right to copy, distribute, adapt, publicly perform, publicly display, and
transmit digitally for copyright law and into the assorted set of rights
under trademark law and state intellectual property regimes. A proper
analysis of intellectual property and antitrust would require a thorough
assessment of each of these rights. But a discussion of the right to ex-
clude from use of intellectual property, at a more general level, illustrates
my point.
How should the right to exclude from use of intellectual property be
allocated? Under the instrumental approach, the intellectual property
owner, who is presumably the creator of intellectual property, should be
given the right if the exclusivity promotes innovation, productive effi-
ciency, or network effects and these benefits outweigh the costs associ-
ated with the exclusivity. As I have shown above, the instrument
approach can too readily support a right to exclude by not scrutinizing
the connection between intellectual property and innovation more
closely. It is possible, however, to add greater precision to the instrumen-
tal model and identify cases where the right to exclude should be limited
in order to promote innovation. In a separate paper, I have made the
argument that the right to exclude in copyright can be understood as a
restriction on entry into the marketplace. 81 The point generalizes to
other forms of intellectual property. Once the right to exclude is recog-
nized as a restriction on entry, the distinction can be made between entry
that improves innovation and entry that does not. If entry improves inno-
vation, then the right to exclude should be limited. If entry does not im-
prove innovation, then the right to exclude should be enforced. Since
market power is related to the right to exclude, limitations on exclusion
translates into removing the presumption of legality of market power and
enforcing exclusion translates into recognizing the presumption.
My proposed approach enhances the instrumental approach by recog-
nizing, first, that mere ownership of intellectual property does not imply
consumer benefits through innovation. Second, my proposed approach
requires more careful analysis of how exercising the right to exclude af-
fects competitive, consumer-benefiting pressures in the marketplace.
Three cases will illustrate the difference between the instrumental ap-
proach and my approach. Take the case of Aspen Skiing, a non-intellec-
tual property case.82 In Aspen Skiing, the antitrust defendant refused to
deal with a competitor in the promotion of a ticket that allowed consum-
ers to ski on both the defendant's and the competitor's ski slopes.83 The
exclusionary act by the defendant resulted in losses to consumers from
81. Shubha Ghosh, Market Entry and the Proper Scope of Copyright, 12(3) INT'L J. OF
THE ECON. OF Bus. 347 (2005).
82. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
83. Id. at 593.
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the introduction of an innovative ticket into the marketplace. 84 There-
fore, the Court was correct in limiting the right to exclude. Similarly, in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., a case deal-
ing with copyright licenses, the Court correctly permitted certain prac-
tices of blanket licensing when there were consumer benefits. 85
The third case is Morris Communications Corp. v. Professional Golf
Association,86 a case not discussed by Professor Harrison. In Morris, the
Professional Golf Association (:PGA") created a real time scoring system
and refused to allow Morris, a journalist for a news service, to have access
to the real time golf scores. 87 The Eleventh Circuit permitted this exclu-
sion on the grounds that the PGA expended great time and money to
create the system and therefore could exclude others from free-riding on
its efforts.88 The court's reasoning illustrates the focus on innovation
consistent with the instrumental approach. However, the case also illus-
trates the dangers of relying solely on the assumption that the new system
is innovative. The court failed to take into consideration the consumer
benefits from having competing news services and multiple access points
to information. I am not suggesting that the outcome of the case would
have been different in light of these benefits. My point is that justifying
exclusion by an antitrust defendant on the grounds that he has been inno-
vative ignores the consumer benefits from competition in further promot-
ing innovation and its distribution, a potential error from application of
the instrumental approach.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Harrison has presented a thoughtful and important challenge
to the presumptive legality of market power in antitrust cases over the
past few decades. My comments are meant to elucidate the source of this
presumption and possible alternatives. I have presented three points.
First, the presumptive legality of market power reflects a tension in eco-
nomic theory between the benefits of competition and the benefits of
large firm size. Second, this tension is reflected in the SCP and Chicago
School approaches to antitrust. Third, one possible resolution is to view
market power as an issue of legal rights, principally the right to exclude,
and to ask how the set of legal rights which constitute market power
should be allocated among firms and consumers. The example of intel-
lectual property provided one context within which to examine this rights
based approach.
Whatever the differences there are between Professor Harrison's in-
strumental approach and my proposal, the two share a common spirit.
Both recognize that market power and the market as an institution are
84. Id. at 606.
85. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979).
86. 364 F. 3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004).
87. Id. at 1293.
88. Id. at 1298.
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means to an end. Both have similar ends: the promotion of competition,
innovation, and benefits to consumers. However, the two approaches
demonstrate differences in how to connect the means to a common end.
These differences reflect contrasting notions of how the competitive pro-
cess works and the relationship between intellectual property and innova-
tion. It is hoped, however, that my response to Professor Harrison's
thought-provoking article will continue the scholarly conversation on
how antitrust law understands and shapes the institution of the market.
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